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PHILOSOPHY AND THE TWO CULTURES 
by A. Cornelius Benjamin 
o one who has scanned nonfictional books and periodicals in the last 
or five years can, I think, fail to be impressed with the increasingly 
frequent appearance of the phrase "the two cultures." The expression is 
not restricted to literary journals, where it would seem quite appropriate, 
but is found in scientific articles, book publishers' lists, college cata- 
logues, and is mentioned with great frequency in commencement ad- 
dresses. It is always in quotes, of course, .since it is well known to 
have been created by Sir Charles P. Snow in his Rede Lecture, The 
Two Cultures and the Scientific Rev~lut ion,~ given at Cambridge Uni- 
versity in 1959. One naturally assumes that those who quote the phrase 
know what Snow had in mind when he employed it, though the context 
in which they use it often indicates confusion, and sometimes complete 
ignorance, as to what he presumably meant. That this misunderstanding 
is not completely without justification I shall attempt to show in the fol- 
lowing paper, since I am convinced that while Snow was wrestling 
with a genuine problem, he was not at all clear in his own mind either 
as to what the problem was or how it was to be solved. 
According to precedent, the lecture was published in England as a 
paper-covered pamphlet the day after i t  was given. There were few re- 
views, some editorial comments, and short excerpts which were pub- 
lished in Encounter. Snow received some interesting private letters, but 
on the whole the lecture attracted littie immediate attention. However, 
according to Snow's own report? by the time a year had passed, articles, 
references, letters, and comments began to appear in great numbers 
from all parts of the world. Some of these were commendatory, some 
personally abusive, some of them stupid, and one essay was so critical 
that it almost resulted in a law suiL3 When the volume of comment fi- 
nally became formidable, Snow decided to take action and attempt to 
clarify his original point of view. His severest critics had objected to the 
word "culture"; many were unhappy with the number "two"; no one, 
he says, complained about the definite article. ( I  propose to criticize 
all three.) He resolved, therefore, to republish in a single voIume the 
original lecture as given, his reactions to some of the criticisms of this 
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material, and a general restatement of his position, admitting certain. 
errors, omissions, and misleading emphases in his first formulation; but 
defending substantially the point of view he had taken at the outset 
The result was the publication of the book mentioned in the footnote 
above, The Two Culttlres: and A Second L ~ o k . ~  
I shall begin by summarizing, I hope not too unfairly, what I under. 
stand to be his problem. There have been so many misleading state. 
ments of his position that I hesitate to venture still another. But he at 
least took his start from the distinction, well recognized by educators 
and the general public alike, between a technical and a liberal educa- 
tion, and tried to account for, and perhaps eliminate, the hostility so 
often exhibited between the two groups of people who have had the 
respective modes of training. Sir Eric Ashby calls it the conflict be. 
tween two powerful social forces-"the influence of the utilitarians and 
the cult of the practical man on the one hand, and the influence of 
the classical humanist and the cult of the scholar-gentleman on the other.": 
While this is partly correct I think it is not an accurate statement 
of Snow's position. The honorific aspect of the words "schoiar-gentle- 
man'' would probably receive his unqualified approval, but the derogatory 
suggestion of the words "practical" and "utilitarian" would seem inap- 
propriate when applied to many scientists as Snow would characterize 
them and even as most people would describe them today. Snow's prob- 
lem was that in advanced Western society educated people (I shall use 
this somewhat vague term for the present) are becoming sharply di- 
vided into two groups who have so little in common intellectually that 
they can scarcely converse with each other. This division among men 
of knowledge is not only increasingly disturbing to our normal social 
life-such as carrying on an intelligent conversation at a dinner party 
where representatives of both groups are present-but, what is much 
more important, i t  makes planning for the future of our civilization 
impossible. For the solutions of the social, political, and moral issues 
before us are now seen to be increasingly dependent not on the one 
group or the other, but on some sort of cooperative action between 
the two. A method must be found, therefore, for dispelling the antago- 
nism between the groups, informing the ignorant in each group of what 
is well known in the other, and establishing a method for bridging 
the gap between them. Only in this way can enlightened choices be 
made concerning the kind of society in which we hope our children 
may live. 
The response to Snow's original lecture, slow though it was in appear- 
ing, convinced the author of two things. In the first place, "if a 
PHILOSOPHY AND THE TWO CULTURES 47 
nePe had been touched almost simultaneously in different intellectual 
societies, in different parts of the world, the ideas which produced the 
response couldn't possibly be original. Original ideas do not carry at 
that speed. . . . The ideas were in the air. Anyone, anywhere, had 
only to choose a form of words. Then--click, the trigger was pressed."" 
the second place, Snow was convinced that there must be something 
in the ideas. This does not mean that they are necessarily right or could 
not have been expressed in different forms, but that "contained in them 
or hidden beneath them, there is something which people all over the 
suspect to be relevant to present actions." 
is, then, was Snow's problem. First, to acquaint the general public 
the existence of these sharply differentiated groups of educated 
le lacking a common vocabulary and a common subject matter, 
have long recognized their status but have done nothing about it. 
Snow hoped to gain this end by finding appropriate words to character- 
ize each of the groups, and thus to clarify the difference which separates 
them. Second, to show that the future of society can be shaped only 
by cooperative efforts on the part of these semi-hostile groups. This 
conflict, he argues, is not new but is part of the Zeitgeist, and its trans- 
parency is recognized as soon as people are made aware of it. 
I1 
There seems to be no doubt whatsoever, at least in Snow's mind, as 
who the people are who constitute one division of this educated 
group. They are the natural scientists, particularly the physical scien- 
tists. Snow is himself a physicist, has pursued research at Cambridge 
University for many years, and was scientific adviser for the British 
Government during the war. As to the other group, Snow never makes 
himself clear; he calls them the "literary intellectuals." Since Snow is 
not only a physicist but a novelist of some repute, having written, ac- 
cording to the last report, nine novels, which have sold moderately 
well, there is some reason to suppose that he is really using himself 
as a pattern for bifurcating the educated public into a scientific part 
which corresponds to his technical interests, and a literary part which 
represents his crcative writing capacities and his frequent references 
to the current world of fiction. 
In spite of Snow's elaborate explanation of why he chose the phrase, 
"the two cultures," to describe these two groups, I think his decision 
was most unfortunate. Offhand I cannot think of a single word in the 
area of his general problem which is so wrought with ambiguity and 
vagueness as the word "~ulture."~ Even small dictionaries give six or 
seven definitions of the term. If we exclude some of the technical uses, 
such as tillage of the soil, the cultivation of a particular crop, e.g., 
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oyster culture, and the biological growth of bacteria in a nutrient 
dium, we are left with two definitions, both of which Snow considers 1, 
be involved in his notion. 
According to the first of these, culture is "intellectual development, 
development of the mind."g Snow admits that this definition has 
carried overtones of a deep and ambiguous sort, and there is an aspect 
of "refinement," not clearly expressed in the definition, which leads us 
when we ask who is cultured to find that the needle points by an ex. 
traordinary coincidence to ourselves. This aspect of the definition I wish 
to disregard for the moment, since I hope to return to it later. But to 
define culture as intellectual development cannot possibly serve any 
useful purpose in distinguishing his two forms of culture, since we have 
already characterized both groups as educated people, and what we 
need is some way of distinguishing not the manner of their education 
but the content. 
Snow's second definition of culture is the commonly accepted an- 
thropological one: "a group of persons living in the same environ- 
ment, linked by common habits, common assumptions, a common way 
of life."1° This description seems to me to be even less illuminating 
as a basis for distinguishing his two groups of intellectuals. To estab- 
lish the fact that physical scientists exhibit a common culture in this 
sense would be extremely difficult, and, fortunately for the reader, I 
shall not make the attempt.ll Of course they use generally the same 
methods and make the same presuppositions in carrying on their studies 
-this goes without saying, and is true for the literary intellectuals 
as well. But I see no evidence that either scientists or literary intel- 
lectuals have a distinctive cultural environment or a distinctive philosophy 
of life. In fact the cold war has done something to science which would 
have seemed impossible thirty years ago-it has developed a geography 
of science. Prior to this time science had been an outstanding example 
of an international, interracial, intersectarian enterprise-a cooperative in- 
stitution on a worldwide basis. To the extent to which the cultures mak- 
ing up this institution became fragmented, differently constituted, and at 
odds with one another cooperation ceased; culturaI similarities in scien- 
tific interests were not strong enough to prevent the divisive influences 
of ideological disagreements. So, too, in the case of the literary intel- 
lectuals. Scientists do not have a distinctive culture, nor do literary in- 
tellectuals. I do not see, therefore, how Snow can use the anthropological 
meaning of the term "culture" to differentiate his two groups on the 
basis of their respective patterns of living. 
What Snow wanted, I believe, and what is contained in still another 
definition of "culture" is that aspect of "refinement" to which reference 
was made above. Snow does not give such a definition in either of his 
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ys, though he could have found one in Webster. But he does make 
ubtle reference to it in a brief article, "The Two Cultures," pub- 
ed three years before the Rede lecture.12 Here he quotes the mathe- 
rnatician G. H. Hardy: " 'It is odd,' says Hardy, 'that when we hear 
about the intellectuals nowadays it doesn't include people like me and 
j, J. Thomsom and Rutherford.' " l3 And Snow would probably add, "Nor 
does it include me in my capacity as a physicist." Snow and the other 
were irked by the fact that according to the prevailing con- 
ception only literary men are intellectual. The Oxford dictionary de- 
fines a liberal education as an education fit for a gentleman. Yet this 
initation at being excluded from the intelligentsia manifested itself in a 
strange way. For in this same article in The New Statesman and 
Nation Snow points out that the scientific culture views with indifference 
& philosophy, but especially metaphysics. The philosopher whom he 
has in mind is Samuel Alexander, and this time it is Rutherford speak- 
ing: "When you think about all of the years you have been talking about 
these things, Alexander, what does it amount to? Hot air, nothing but 
hot air!"14 This, says Snow, is the opinion of contemporary scientists. 
They regard it as a major intellectual virtue to know what not to think 
about. But the embarrassment arises from the fact that Alexander, by 
no stretch of the imagination, could be called a scientist; nor was he 
a literary intellectual as Snow defines the term. Yet, as I indicated 
above, Snow is extremely vague in his definition of this latter group, 
and if there are to be only two cultures Alexander would certainly be 
more closely allied to the literary group than to the scientists. But why 
should the scientists want to be identified with the intellectuals if their 
products are frequently nothing but hot air? Presumably the scientists 
have only two choices: either to be intellectuals and find that they often 
have very undesirable bedfellows, or to be nonintellectuals and discover 
that they are then classified not as gentlemen, but as gadgeteers and 
appeared to be unable to find a definition of culture 
h would place the scientists among the social elite, and hence would 
antee that element of "refinement" and prestige to which he made 
previous reference. The fact that Webster defines the term in one place 
as "the enlightenment and refinement of taste acquired by intellectual 
and aesthetic training"16 does not seem to satisfy Snow in spite of his 
presumed knowledge of the musical competence of a Teller or an Ein- 
stein, and his awareness of the deep appreciation of music exhibited by 
many scientists. These appeared to him to be isolated cases, and he 
wonders how much of the traditional (literary) culture gets through to 
scientists in general,1° and to what degree the interests of scientists often 
extend into the area of religious, moral, political, legal, and humanitar- 
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ian values. He is forced to the conclusion that although scientists might 
have high competence in matters of social policy, they are not generally 
recognized as authorities in this area and are rarely consulted when ques. 
tions of value come up for decision. 
That Snow finally solved his problem by a bit of skillful linguistic 
Iegerdemain would, perhaps, be too severe a criticism. But that he up. 
parently solved it to the satisfaction of most people by the introduction 
of the weasel word "culture" hardly seems deniable. In Jacques Bar. 
zun's review l7 of Aldous Huxley's last book he states that the phrase 
"the two cultures" has become a "too successful clich6"; it apparently 
solves many problems but really solves none. In fact if some of its pre. 
suppositions are accepted it actually prevents the essential difficulty from 
being met. I shall argue, therefore, that Snow, by defining science in 
an unnecessarily restrictive way, and by defining the literary intellec- 
tuals so amorphously as to leave the reader completely in the dark 
as to whom they include has confused the issue rather than clarified 
it, Let me list, first, the errors which Snow himself discovered in his 
first formulation of the problem, when he reexamined it in his "second 
Iook." 
A'nong the most important of the mistakes which Snow hastens to 
correct in the second essay is his original restriction of the number of 
cultures to two. His thinking on this problem can best be explained in 
his own words taken from the first lecture: 
The number 2 is a very dangerous number: that is why the dialectic is a dan- 
gerous process. Attempts to divide anything into two ought t o  be regarded 
with much suspicion. I have thought a long time about going in for further 
refinements: but in the end I have decided against. I was searching for some- 
thing a little more than a dashing metaphor, a good deal less than a cultural 
map: and for these purposes the two cultures is about right, and subtilizing any 
more would bring more disadvantages than it is worth.ls 
It is here, I believe, that Snow committed his greatest error: the 
important but highly complicated problem which he was considering 
cannot be solved by a "dashing metaphor." Metaphors solve nothing: 
they frequently illuminate; they often confuse; and by the looseness of 
their terminology they suggest quite different interpretations of the issue 
being considered. On the other hand, "cultural maps" do involve sub- 
tilizing. As we have already seen, the word "culture" demands precise 
definition before it can function as a clarifying term in the problem, 
and as we shall see in a minute the word "two" proves to have been 
a positive error. The result is that in order to solve his problem Snow 
will have to subtilize about the term "literary intellectual"; about the 
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difference between pure and applied sciences; about the problem of 
human values-and he will find himself, in spitc of his wishes, deep in 
the intricacies of philosophy. It seems obvious to me that the world- 
wide controversy which was gznerated by his first lecture was due to 
the fact that he chose to solve his problem by a dashing metaphor which 
lent itself to so many varied interpretations that his critics insisted on a 
more analytic approach, in spite of the subtleties which this would nec- 
essarily involve. His commentators were not surprised at his disclosure 
of a complex problem of social control which was urgently in need of 
solution; they knew that this problem existed and that it was the result 
of the rapid growth of science, particularly in its increasingly practical 
role. But they also recognized the magnitude of the problem, and were 
genuinely disturbed that a glib phrase could be proposed to slay, at one 
blow, such a huge monster. 
In Snow's second account he explains why he divided his educated 
goup into two cultures: 
I think , . . that writing as an Englishman made me insensitive to something 
which may, within a few years, propel the argument in another direction or 
which conceivably may already have started to do just that. I have been increas- 
ingly impressed by a body of intellectual opinion, forming itself, without any 
kind of lead or conscious direction, under the surface of this debate. . . . This 
body of opinion seems to come from intellectual persons in  a variety of 
fields-social-history, sociology, demography, political science, economics, gov- 
ernments (in the American academic sense), psychology, medicine, and social 
arts such as architecture. It seems a mixed bag: but there is an inner con- 
sistency. All of them are concerned with how human beings are living or have 
lived-and concerned, not in terms of legend, but in terms of fact. I am not 
implying that they agree with each other, but in their approach to cardinal 
problems-such as the human effects of the scientific revolution, which is the 
fighting point of this whole affair-they display, at least, a family resemblance. 
I ought, I see now, to have expected this. I haven't, much excllse for not 
doing so. I have been in close intellectual contact with social historians most 
of my life: they have influenced me a good deal: their recent researches were 
the basis for a good many of my statements. But nevertheless I was slow to. 
observe the development of what, in terms of our formula, is becoming some- 
thing like a third c~ l tu re . '~  
ile this has not commonly been called a "culture" in this country, 
long been recognized as a legitimate study in spite of some of 
dubious subjects, such as medicine and architecture, which are in- 
ed by Snow but do not quite fit into our pattern. I happen to 
efer the term "behavioral" to "social" to characterize these studies, 
t this is a matter of no great import. Now I do not propose to involve 
yself at this point in the issue of scientism, i.e., whether the methods 
the natural sciences are applicable to the behavioral sciences with 
ficient success to warrant the latter being included in the sciences in 
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the basic sense. But Snow's pronouncement clearly indicates that in 
initial attempt to bifurcate the world he felt either that the nat 
sciences were the only sciences, or that human, preferential behavior 
not constitute an element of experience which had enough importance 
to be classified among the basic cultures. This omission I think was a 
serious one, but he deserves credit in his "second look" for recognizing 
that the behavioral studies might be at least an embryonic third type of 
culture, whether scientific or nonscientific. 
He explains both his overemphasis on the sharpness of the division 
into two cultures and his failure to recognize a possible third culture 
by saying that he was speaking as an Englishman, educated in England, 
and that he was strongly influenced by continental education, particularly 
German. In both systems the student, usually early in his career, makes 
a choice between a technical education and a literary one, which never 
overlap, and which leave him consequently blind to half of what con- 
stitutes the intellectual competence of the truly educated man.20 How- 
ever, in America Snow discovers, apparently to his amazement, not only 
that many students are exposed to both cultures but that in technological 
schools, whose curricula would presumably be largely centered on 
sciences in general, and on practical sciences in particular, extensive op- 
portunities are given to all students to pursue education in humanities, 
literature, and philosophy. Indeed, in at least one technological schoo121 
a full doctorate program is now offered, which is designed precisely 
to bridge the two cultures. Thus, in the United States the break between 
the two forms is not so sharp as he had led his readers to suppose. 
Students are not only given opportunities but actually urged to adopt 
curricula whose precise goal is to eliminate the situation which Snow 
is deploring. 
Snow's third modification in his original point of view is not in the 
reference to a further distinction but in the apparent abandonment of 
one which had seemed essential when he first defined the two cultures 
-that between pure and applied science. He introduced this by suggest- 
ing that there is a very important difference between an industrial rev- 
olution and a scientific revolution. Part of the social crisis today lies 
in the fact that the old mechanical science, which determined the indus- 
trial revolution of the eighteenth century, is so different from today's 
electronics, atomic energy, and automation, that we have no way of pre- 
dicting vhat kind of technoIogica1 revolution the newer science will pro- 
duce. But in Snow's second thoughts he seems to suggest abandoning 
entirely the distinction between pure science and technology, at least as 
a difference between two kinds of science. His grounds for this rejec- 
tion lie in the practical difficulty in deciding whether any particular ex- 
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of scientific investigation is pure or applied. In this possibility of 
ing a given case I should certainly agree with him. 
that the fundamental distinction between them exists, and even 
ns in his own mind, is clear from the following quotation: "The 
ific process has two motives: one is to understand the natural 
, the other is to control it. Either of these motives may be domi- 
t in any individual scientist; fields of science may draw their original 
ulses from one or the other."22 Pure science, in other words, is the 
suit of truth concerning the structure and operation of the world 
no regard whatsoever for the use to which this knowledge is to 
t in the way of making men happier or the world better; it is 
tisfaction of an intellectual curiosity and is much like solving cross- 
puzzles except that its problems are posed by nature and not by 
. Applied science is the modification of the world toward the at- 
nt of our goals and ideals. 
while this both defines and justifies the distinction between pure 
applied science it does not remove the ambiguity in the term "ap- 
science." What we should like to say is that there remains the 
ction between the "pure" applied scientist and the "applied" ap- 
scientist. Does the applied scientist actually change the world as 
ult of his knowledge of pure science, or does he merely show us 
this can be done in case it is so desired? Unfortunately the term 
lied scientist" has come to be used to describe both the scientist 
indulges in applied research, but who makes no changes whatso- 
r in the world, and the artisan, the practitioner, and even the profes- 
a1 man, who actually manipulate nature by introducing the instru- 
ts which will create the desired ends. Unless this distinction is main- 
ed we shall continually confuse engineering schools with manufactur- 
companies, schools of business and public administration with busi- 
s enterprises, and medical schools with medical clinics. The distinc- 
very important because the solution to the problem of the social 
ibilities of the scientist rests upon it. But into this question I 
ot go at this point. 
w is certainly to be criticized for not making abundantly clear 
er he does or does not accept this basic distinction. But what is 
ore concern is his failure to recognize that the terms "applied 
ce" and its equivalent, "technology," are both subject to a serious 
~guity. If I might be allowed, for the moment, to speak in an over- 
ed language, I should say that pure science attempts to discover 
relations between events in the world. Now a pure science be- 
an applied science by a very simple transformation: if the effect 
ething which does not exist at a certain time and place but we 
like to have it exist, then we employ the cause as an instrument 
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(provided it is under our control) by which we create the desired 
effect. Thus cause-and-effect relations in pure science become means. 
end relations in applied science, and what determines the transformation 
is the fact that something which does not exist is desired by man. The 
notion of applied science is meaningless apart from the notion of value. 
In summary, I have shown that Snow tried to raise the prestige of 
scientists by calling them "cultured." In order to do this he had to de. 
fine by a dashing metaphor a new culture-a scientific culture-which 
proved to be confusing since it became contrasted with an English and 
continental culture much more narrowly conceived than the broad, 
humanistic culture of our American colleges and universities. Then, al- 
most by accident, he discovered a culture which he had previously 
overlooked-the behavioral sciences. Finally, although his main problem 
was to determine the social role of the scientist, he equivocated on the 
distinction between the pure and applied sciences. 
I am of the opinion that the real source of Snow's confusion is his 
failure to recognize that the problem which he has undertaken to solve 
is a philosophical one. So far as I can detect after several readings of 
Snow's serious writings he mentions the word "philosophy" in the derog- 
atory context above, where he refers to Rutherford's comment on Alex- 
ander's writing, but rarely elsewhere, and then in settings which are 
merely incidental. However, according to aImost any of the traditional 
conceptions of philosophy what Snow is doing is philosophy. He is ex- 
amining the universe and trying to discover "parts," which he wants 
to call "cultures," and which he wishes to interrelate into a whole. 
Many would agree that this is what Snow is doing, and that the re- 
sults are, indeed, "hot air," If this is true the most expedient solution 
would be not to wait for Snow to take a "third look" at the problem, 
but to advise him to abandon the two cultures completely and start 
again from the beginning, this time philosophically. I am afraid such a 
suggestion is too late. Barzun was obviously right in saying that the 
phrase "the two cultures" has become a too successful clich6; people 
are going to continue to use it in spite of anything we can now do. 
This is discouraging, for the problem which Snow has raised is not only 
complicated but urgently in need of a solution. As he says, the wide- 
spread reaction to his thesis clearly indicates that the ideas contained 
in it are considered by people all over the world to be relevant to the 
present social situation. It is a pity, therefore, that we must first undo 
all that Snow has done before we can face the problem in an un- 
prejudiced manner. 
Whar general conclusions can we draw? Snow has grossly over- 
simplified the problem, and some further explorations and careful analy- 
ses will be required in order to resolve some of the resulting difficulties. 
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snow is prone to metaphorical thinking: the literary intellectuals repre- 
sent a culture; so also, by a broadening meaning of the word, do the 
The behavioral scientists, newly discovered by Snow, exhibit 
many common interests and methods; let us also give them the status 
of a culture. And even on the negative side the vagueness of the cultural 
prevents him from making up his mind as to whether the 
pure sciences are culturally different from the applied. And, finally, 
is denied cultural status simply because Snow does not real- 
ize that when cultures are defined, there is the further cultural task of 
integrating them into a unified whole. 
But because of these confusions in Snow's thought, there are many 
misleading interpretations of his position. For example, many of those 
\yho adopt the "two culture" phraseology clearly suppose him to have 
set up a fact-value dichotomy: to scientists is assigned the study of 
facts; to humanists the study of values. I do not think that this was 
Snow's intention, in spite of the fact that it offers him certain advantages 
in his use of the cultural metaphor. It tends to destroy the social supe- 
riority of the humanists over the scientists, so much resented by the lat- 
ter group. For valued objects are clearly objects-be they the abstrac- 
tions of logic and mathematics, mass-energy, life, or human behavior 
-and these lie in the field of the sciences if the area is given proper 
breadth, Another advantage is the fact that the scientist can see his 
subject matter as not completely value-free, but as a vaIue potential. 
Every fact is a value possibility-even if only to be known, to be 
painted, to be the subject of a poem, or to be the object of religious 
worship. Thus the scientist is in a position to provide the humanist 
with material for embellishing life and emphasizing its characteristically 
valuational aspects. Snow seems to be rightly disturbed by our failure to 
create individuals who can be, so to speak, doubly cultured in the sense 
that they always see the interrelationships of facts and values. But if 
his initial examination of the world had been less hasty, less tied up 
with unfortunate terminology, less prejudiced by nationalistic points of 
view, and more empirical in its approach, he would have discovered that 
facts and values are integral parts of our total culture, interrelated in a 
very complicated map, and that he has separated them only through a 
vicious abstraction which will plague him to the end of his days. 
IV 
who is to solve the problem which Snow has set up must 
e that his task is, indeed, a philosophical one, and must be 
en with full knowledge of the scope and complexities of the en- 
terprise. As we have abundantly seen, a dashing metaphor will not work: 
a detailed map of the universe is required. Metaphors are crude and 
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suggestive rather than straightforward; maps have not only precise bound. 
aries but they locate areas in their relations one to another. 
One finds it difficult to understand why Snow, who realizes that the 
problem can be solved only by better education, refuses to recognize 
that our schools, particularly our universities, have from their inception 
provided us with highly accurate maps of the universe, reflecting not 
only man's aims and ideals but his accomplishments and findings as 
well. He says, in fact, that we can do something about the problem. 
"The chief means open to us is education-education mainly in the 
primary and secondary schools, but also in colleges and universities, 
There is no excuse for letting another generation be as vastly ignorant, 
or as devoid of understanding and sympathy, as we ourselves."23 Why, 
then, should we not turn to our universities for light? The great di- 
versity exhibited in the curricula of our institutions of higher learning 
should cause us neither to lose faith in their reliability as indicators of 
what there is in the universe that is worth examining, nor to despair 
because of the complexity of the problem to be solved. Snow has more 
or less unconsciously uncovered important areas of study, but he has 
misnamed them and confused their interrelationships. 
In this concluding section I shall venture to list the main fields of 
inquiry to which we must turn for the solution to the problem of social 
control and related issues. I shall not use the word "culture" to desig- 
nate these areas, for reasons which I hope have been made clear in 
the preceding pages. For the same reason I shall not speak of the 
cultivation of these areas, but shaII use the accepted academic word 
"disciplines" to designate scholarly investigations into these fields of in- 
qu iry. Our task, then, is to produce a pattern of the most general 
areas of the universe, and a corresponding map of the disciplines by 
which these areas are to be investigated. 
Outstanding among these fields are the sciences as disciplines and their 
corresponding fields of exploration as subject matter, The recent revolu- 
tion in mathematics (to which Snow, strangely enough, makes no ref- 
erence) demands, I think, that we distinguish sharply the natural scien- 
ces (biological and physical) from pure mathematics and logic. Similarly 
I believe that we must, in spite of Snow's reluctance to do so, admit 
the behavioral sciences into the field of the sciences; certainly they 
share methods with the natural sciences, yet exhibit their own peculian- 
ties just as mathematical logic both resembles and differs from the nat- 
ural sciences. 
But the sciences are not just sciences-they are pure or applied. 
Now this distinction is not only in method but subject matter as well. 
Both the logico-mathematical and the natural sciences are value-free (ex- 
cept insofar as truth itself is a value), but so also are the behavioral 
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which study values as objective manifestations of preferential 
behavior. As was suggested above, pure science becomes applied science 
,&en effects are seen as ends and causes are interpreted as means. 
This is true in mathematics, physics, and biology, but it is no less true 
the behavioral sciences. Pure behavioral sciences describe existing 
of valuational behavior, and are thus not normative sciences ex- 
cept in the sense that they portray the prevailing norms of a given soci- 
,ty. Applied behavioral sciences in their simplest form tell us how to 
find the instruments by means of which society may be bettered; they 
thus deal with instrumental values primarily, not with final values. The 
full-blown applied behavioral sciences are policy-making sciences and 
attempt to determine the ultimate goals of human living in the many 
of our experience. 
wever, the field of the applied scientist, whether mathematical 
, naturalist, or sociologist, is not to be confused with that of 
the special worker-the artisan, the laborer, the technician, the business- 
man, the agriculturist, the doctor, the lawyer, even the teacher-whose 
task is to put means to work in order to produce the desired ends, 
once they have been approved by the social group. Thus we have 
created a new "culturey'-the manipulators-who by skill and knowl- 
edge actually transform the world (hopefully) into a better place to 
live, in which there will be a greater abundance of health, wealth, knowl- 
edge, piety, morality, and beauty. Some of these manipulators engage 
in these activities as trades and professions, by which they earn a liv- 
ing; others pursue them simply as avocations or as instruments for 
the production of a fuller life-a life which, without them, would be 
ill, poor, ignorant, sinful, immoral, and surrounded by ugliness. 
Among the disciplines which a philosophical map of the universe dis- 
closes, perhaps the hardest to distinguish one from the other are the 
behavioral sciences and the humanities. Snow discovered the former 
only after a second look; he defined the latter in terms of the "literary 
intellectuals," and we found that he was quite unclear as to whom 
this included. He refers most often to men like himself, who are 
novelists and literary critics. But he obviously means to include a 
group which is much wider in scope-all those who deal with the basic 
human values of truth, beauty, morality, piety, law and government, ed- 
ucation, health, recreation, and all of the goals which contribute to the 
well-being of mankind. The problem is that both the behavioral sciences 
and what are commonly called the "humanities" deal with precisely these 
values. How, then, are they to be distinguished? 
ce this is a highly controversial issue and many methods for dis- 
the two have been offered in the history of thought, 
te my view d~gmatically.~~ I find it convenient to define 
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the humanities as the meta-behavioral sciences. (The term "meta-science~~ 
has come into our vocabulary recently largely through the study of 
language. When we study a language we must be careful not to confuse 
the language which we are studying with the language by means of 
which we are studying it; the latter is commonly called a "meta-language.") 
Transferring the terminology, we may speak of certain disciplines a, 
studies of sciences in much the same way that the sciences are studies 
of their own subject matter. Then meta-sociology (often called "social 
philosophy") will be one of the humanities; so also will be meta. 
economics, meta-political science, meta-education, and meta-psychology, 
The danger in this terminology is that a meta-science will be judged 
to be essentially the same kind of discipline as the science it studies. 
Nothing could be further from the truth. Meta-sciences are character- 
ized by the fact that they examine the methods and presuppositions 
of the sciences which they study; they bring to light the assumptions; 
they clarify and validate the methods; and they evaluate the goals. Their 
methods may or may not be like the methods of the "lower level" 
sciences; usually they are quite different. C. D. Broad calls such stud- 
ies "critical philosophy," and if he is correct all of the humanities are 
to this degree philosophical. Whether a study of any mode of behavior 
is one of the sciences or one of the humanities will depend upon the 
degree of critical analysis which is employed; this is difficult to decide 
in any case, but no more of a problem than it has been in the past 
when we have attempted to distinguish sociology from social philosophy, 
political science from political philosophy, or any other behavioral science 
from the examination of its methods and presuppositions. 
Thus far we have seen that our map of the universe must contain 
abstractions, which are studied by mathematical logic; mass energy, which 
is studied by the physical sciences; life, which is studied by the bio- 
logical sciences; and human valuational behavior, which is studied by 
the behavioral sciences. Furthermore, we have seen that each of these 
sciences may be pure or applied. And we have discovered that each 
applied science is potentially put to work to improve man's life on earth 
-a fact which generates a new category of "manipulators." These are 
roughly divided into two groups, not sharply differentiated from each 
other. On the one hand are those who make up the trades and pro- 
fessions; they pursue these activities as lifework. On the other hand, 
there are those of us who may or may not earn our living by these 
activities, but carry them on nevertheless either as avocations or at- 
tempts to fill out our individual lives in order to realize our full 
potentialities as human beings. Finally, there are the humanities or 
meta-sciences, whose subject matter and whose methods are quite dif- 
ferent from any of those thus far considered. This, then, is our list 
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of disciplines: mathematical logic, natural science (physical and biolog- 
ical), behavioral science, pure science, applied science, trades and oc- 
cupations (which are not disciplines in the strict sense), and meta- 
science. But this is not all. 
For what I have just done is to draw a map of the universe, and 
activity is not contained in any of the categories listed above. 
This is the task of the philosopher par excellence. Snow did not con- 
sider it important because he felt that it would lead to unnecessary 
If these are all "cuItures," then there are nine "cultures," 
not two. And the problems of the interrelations between them-which 
was his main consideration-are tremendously more complex than he had 
supposed. I have merely listed the disciplines; the task of uncovering 
their complex interrelationships is forbidding in its scope and intricacy. 
The purpose of this paper has been to discourage Snow from taking a 
third look. Without a map he will only sink deeper into the quagmires 
of "cultures." 
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